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12 March 1960

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

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director/Intelligence
Attention: 

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**SUBJECT: Comments on "The Feasibility and National
Security Implications of a Monitored
Agreement to Stop or Limit Ballistic
Missile Testing and/or Production"**

1. This is a briefing memorandum on subject paper currently
scheduled for NSC action on 14 March 1960.

2. Pursuant to NSC action 2161-b, subject paper has been
prepared by an ad hoc group under the direction of the Special
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and chaired
by Dr. Donald Ling from Bell Telephone Laboratories, who will
brief NSC on the scope and conclusion of the paper. Agency member-
ship thereon consisted of  and the undersigned;
able and willing support was also provided by Messrs. 

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3. The Terms of Reference for subject study are attached
thereto as Annex A (page 39). Our group was specifically instructed



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not to engage the "stability" question in terms of numbers of missiles required or desirable on each side. Consequently, the paper does not have a statement of the objective of missile bans in terms of a strategic rationale against which the feasibility and national security implication can be readily tested. Neither does the paper consider the desirability of achieving stability in our respective deterrence postures.

4. During the preparation of subject paper, two noteworthy problems were encountered. First, several members were not closely familiar with intelligence and seriously questioned the ICBM accuracies contained in NIE 11-5-59, and the ICBM production figures contained in NIE 11-8-59. The excellent presentation provided by ONE greatly assisted in overcoming these difficulties. Secondly, the JCS, having leasade the activities of this ad hoc group, undertook, on a crash basis, to prepare a JCS "position" paper. Such has been prepared, but too late to be incorporated or officially considered in subject paper. The JCS has, therefore, submitted their views to Secretary Gates, who has in turn transmitted

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same to Mr. Gordon Grey (a copy thereof you noted on 9 March 1960 and is attached hereto as Tab A). The JCS view is completely negative for the time periods under consideration. Resolution of differences between the JCS position and subject paper probably will not occur prior to NSC consideration.

5. The primary conclusion of subject paper which holds some hope for possible consideration in the forthcoming Geneva disarmament discussion pertains to the implications of a missile flight test ban (see page 4, paragraph 10). At the present moment, [] is somewhat optimistic concerning inclusion of this aspect of the missile problem in current disarmament discussions. In view of the limitations and scope denoted on page 1, paragraph 2, I feel we should move with extreme caution; there are many directly related aspects requiring more detailed study before a thorough net assessment can be formulated.

6. Your attention is also directed to the likely effect of a missile flight test ban on space programs (see paras. 6 & 8). Specifically, the proposal would subject any continuing space program to rigid inspection and some controls, whether that program be civilian,

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reconnaissance satellites or truly military in nature. Should the U.S. desire to proceed with a missile flight test ban, I urge that action be expedited to assure that reconnaissance satellites are recognized world-wide in their stabilizing role rather than continuing to be automatically labelled "military" satellites. This could be extremely important should the USSR propose to ban all military uses of space.

7. In summary, I feel subject paper represents a good "broad-brush" assessment of the problem within the prescribed time, scope and limitations. It should be recognized, however, that this paper at best can only be considered a relatively isolated treatment of one segment of the disarmament problem. It is for this reason that I therefore recommend we move forward cautiously, particularly when determining areas to be tabled for immediate consideration in the Geneva discussions.

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence

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